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ABSTRACT
TOWARDS AN UNDETECTABLE COMPUTER VIRUS
by Priti Desai
Metamorphic viruses modify their own code to produce viral copies which are
syntactically different from their parents. The viral copies have the same functionality as
the parent but may have different signatures. This makes signature-based virus scanners
unreliable for detecting metamorphic viruses. But statistical pattern analysis tool such as
Hidden Markov Models (HMMs) can detect metamorphic viruses.
Virus writers use many different code obfuscation techniques to generate metamorphic
viruses. In this project we develop a metamorphic engine using code obfuscation
techniques. Our metamorphic engine is designed to produce highly diverse morphed
copies of the base virus. We show that commercial virus scanners cannot detect
metamorphic viruses produced by our engine. We then proceed to determine whether
HMMs can detect metamorphic viruses generated by our engine.
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1. Introduction
A computer virus is a malware that, when executed, tries to infect other executables and
alter their default behavior [12]. A virus copies itself into an infected executable without
permission or knowledge of a user [13]. According to Fred Cohen, “A computer virus is a
program that can infect other programs by modifying them to include a possibly evolved
copy of itself" [17]. The first computer virus was a boot sector virus called Brain, created
in 1986 by two brothers, Basit and Amjad Farooq Alvi, operating out of Lahore, Pakistan.
Generally a computer virus causes damage to the host machine. The damage can be done
to a number of different components of the computer's operating and file system. These
include system sectors, files, macros, companion files and source code. The always
connected world of internet is a soft target for viruses. Viruses use internet connectivity
to spread across the world faster and create havoc. The early detection of viruses is
imperative to minimize the damages caused by them.
There are many antivirus defense mechanisms available today. These include signature
detection and code emulation. The signature based virus detection tools search all the
files on a system for a signature. Code emulation creates a virtual machine and executes a
virus on the virtual machine for detection. Once the virus is detected, it is no longer a
threat.
To bypass signature detection technique, virus writers have to create new viruses or
change the existing viruses. Virus writers evade signature detection by generating
metamorphic copies of a virus. Metamorphic viruses change their appearance while
keeping the same functionality. Metamorphic viruses use different code obfuscation
techniques to change the structure of the code. These techniques include code reordering
through jumps, subroutine permutation, dead code insertion, equivalent instruction
substitution, and rearrangement of instruction order (transposition).
The statistical pattern analysis is the most successful technique to detect metamorphic
viruses [2]. Hidden Markov Model (HMM) is the well known statistical pattern analysis
tool. HMM has been widely used in speech recognition and protein modeling. HMM has
been extended to detect metamorphic viruses.
Metamorphic viruses with combination of code reordering through jumps and dead code
insertion evades signature detection but are detected by HMM [9]. In this project we
determine whether extensive metamorphism can evade HMM.
The aim of this project is to develop a metamorphic engine. We used code obfuscation
techniques like equivalent instruction substitution, dead code insertion and rearrangement
of instruction order. We designed our metamorphic engine to generate highly discrete
copies of the base virus. These morphed copies are tested against the HMM model of the

1

base virus family, normal files, and our own morphed copies. We also tested our
morphed copies against commercial virus scanners.
This paper is organized as follows:
• Section 2 contains information about computer viruses.
• Section 3 discusses various anti-virus technologies currently used.
• Section 4 contains information about the evolution of viruses.
• Section 5 details a few code obfuscation techniques that are used for generating
metamorphic variants.
• Section 6 describes our virus similarity test.
• Section 7 introduces HMM as virus detection tool.
• Section 8 and 9 details the design, implementation, and experimental results of
our metamorphic engine.
• Section 10 draws conclusions based upon our findings.
• Section 11 discusses additional future enhancements.

2. Computer Virus
“A computer virus is a malicious program that modifies other host files to replicate. The
host is modified to include a complete copy of the malicious code program. The
execution of the infected host file infects other objects” [16]. Generally a computer virus
consists of three modules [12].
def virus() :
infect ()
if trigger () is true then
payload ()

Figure 1: Pseudo code of a computer virus [12]
Infect defines how a virus spreads. One common infection mechanism is to modify host
to contain copy of virus code. Trigger is a test to decide to deliver the payload or not.
Payload defines damage done by the virus. Trigger and payload are optional. Figure 1
shows pseudo code of a virus.
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def infect() :
repeat k times:
target = select_target()
if no target then
return
infect_code (target)
Figure 2: Pseudo code of infect module [12]
Infect module selects a target to infect. Generally k targets are selected on each run.
Select_target defines criteria by which a target is selected. The same target should not be
selected repeatedly otherwise infecting the same code repeatedly may reveal the presence
of the virus. infect_code performs actual infection by inserting virus’s code into the
target.

3. Antivirus Defense Techniques
This section presents some of the most popular techniques used by antivirus software to
detect computer viruses.
3.1

Signature Detection

A signature is a string of bits found in a virus [1]. An effective signature is the string of
bits which is commonly found in viruses but not likely to be found in normal programs.
Generally each virus has its own unique signature. All known signatures are organized in
a database. A signature-based virus detection tool searches for a known signature in all
the files on a system. The following example is a signature of W32/Beast virus in
infected executable files [22].
83EB 0274 EB0E 740A 81EB 0301 0000
The virus scanner searches executables for this signature. If this signature is present in
any executable file, it is declared as the Beast virus.
3.2

Heuristic Analysis

Heuristic analysis is useful in detecting new or unknown viruses. Heuristic analysis can
be static or dynamic. Static heuristics mainly analyzes the file format and the code
structure of virus body. Dynamic heuristics use code emulators to detect unusual
behavior while the virus code is running inside the emulator. The following examples are
the suspicious characteristics of heuristic analysis of 32 bit windows viruses [4]:
•

Code execution starts in the last section
3

•
•
•
•

Virtual size is incorrect in PE header
Possible “Gap” between sections
Suspicious code section name
Suspicious imports from Kernel32.dll by ordinal

Heuristic analysis creates many false positives. A false positive is to declare a benign
program as a virus. An antivirus scanner creating many false positives looses user’s trust
and interest. The following section explains techniques used by virus writers to evade
signature detection and heuristic analysis.

4. Advanced Code Evolution Techniques
To bypass detection by the user or antivirus software, viruses use different concealment
strategies. Some of the concealment strategies are listed below.
4.1

Encryption

Encryption is the simplest way to hide virus body. Encryption changes the appearance of
a virus. An encrypted virus consists of a small decrypting module (a decryptor) and an
encrypted virus body. Generally simple encryption methods are used like XOR of the key
with each byte of the virus body. And if a different key is used for each infection, the
encrypted virus body will look different. But the decryptor always remains constant. As a
result, detection is still possible. A virus scanner can recognize the decryptor in most
cases.
4.2

Polymorphism

To overcome drawbacks of encryption, polymorphic virus mutates virus body along with
decryptor. Polymorphic virus has no part that stays constant on each infection. To detect
polymorphic viruses, antivirus software implements a code emulator which emulates the
decryption process and dynamically decrypts the encrypted virus body. Polymorphic
viruses after decryption have a constant virus body. Therefore decrypted virus body can
be easily detected.
4.3

Metamorphism

Unlike polymorphic viruses, metamorphic viruses do not employ encryption.
Metamorphic viruses change the appearance of the code while keeping the functionality
of virus intact. Metamorphic viruses use several code obfuscation techniques including
Instruction reordering, data reordering, subroutine inlining, subroutine outlining, register
renaming, code permutation, instruction substitution, and garbage code insertion. Figure 3
shows the distinct signatures of the metamorphic viruses.
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Figure 3: Metamorphic virus generations
4.3.1 Anatomy of a Metamorphic Virus
Generally a metamorphic virus has the metamorphic engine embedded within itself.
During infection a metamorphic virus creates morphed copy of itself using the embedded
engine. A typical metamorphic engine consists of following functional units. Some of
these units are optional.
Locate own code
Decode
Analyze
Transform
Attach
Figure 4: Anatomy of a metamorphic engine [15]
A metamorphic engine reads in the virus executable and locates the code to be
transformed using locate own code module. Every engine has its own transformation
rules. The transformation rules define how a particular opcode or a sequence of opcodes
is to be transformed. Decode module extracts these rules by disassembling.
Analyze module analyzes current copy of the virus and determines the transformations to
be applied for generating next morphed copy. Transform module performs the actual
transformations. It replaces an instruction or block of instructions with the other
equivalent code. The last module attach attaches the transformed copy to a host.
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4.3.2 The Metamorphic Virus According to a Virus Writer
Generally a virus writer considers how to infect a file and the behavior of the infected
file. In addition to these, a virus writer writing a metamorphic virus has to consider how
to generate morphed copies of the virus. To generate morphed copies, a metamorphic
engine is embedded within the virus body. A typical metamorphic engine may contain
[18]:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Internal disassembler
Opcode shrinker
Opcode expander
Opcode swapper
Relocator/recalculator
Garbager
Cleaner

Internal disassembler disassembles the binary / executable code, instruction by
instruction. Opcode shrinker performs optimization of instructions. Opcode shrinker
replaces two or more instructions with one equivalent instruction. Opcode expander is the
reverse operation of opcode shrinker. It replaces one instruction with several instructions.
Opcode swapper changes the order of the instructions. Generally it swaps two unrelated
instructions. Relocator relocates relative references like jump and call. Garbager inserts
do-nothing instructions. Cleaner undoes Garbager, i.e. it removes do-nothing instructions
inserted by Garbager.
Characteristics of an effective metamorphic engine [18]:
1. A metamorphic engine should be able to handle any opcode of an assembly
language. An engine should know all of the opcodes.
2. Opcode shrinker and swapper should process more than one instruction
concurrently.
3. Use Garbager in moderate amount.
4. Garbage should not affect actual instructions.
5. Opcode swapper should analyze each instruction and should not affect the
execution of next instruction.
We have implemented the metamorphic engine as an external tool. This tool reads in a
hand written assembly program or disassembled virus executable.
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5. Code Obfuscation Techniques
Metamorphic engine uses code obfuscation techniques to produce morphed copies of an
original program. Generally the obfuscated code is more difficult to read and understand
[1]. Code obfuscation can be used to generate different looking copies of a single parent
file. This section explains the code obfuscation techniques for assembly programs.
Code obfuscation techniques for assembly programs operate on both the control flow and
data section of the program [19]. Control flow obfuscation involves reordering of
instructions through insertion of jumps. Data flow obfuscation can be done in many ways
such as equivalent code substitution, subroutine permutation, dead code insertion, register
renaming, and transposition. Table 1 summarizes some well known metamorphic viruses
and the code obfuscation techniques used by them.
Table 1: Metamorphic Viruses and Code Obfuscation Techniques [19]

5.1

Register Usage Exchange (Register Renaming)

Register renaming modifies register operands of an instruction without changing the
instruction itself. The instructions remain constant across all morphed copies only the
operands change. RegSwap was one of the early metamorphic viruses to use register
usage exchange. Figure 5 shows two pieces of code from two different generations of
RegSwap.
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Figure 5: Two different generations of RegSwap [4]
Two generations of RegSwap (a) and (b) have the same sequence of instructions but the
registers are different. Here the registers edx, edi, esi, eax, and ebx have been replaced by
eax, ebx, edx, edi, and esi respectively.
5.2

Dead Code Insertion

Inserting dead code or do-nothing instruction does not affect the execution of the original
code. Dead code can be a single instruction or a block of instructions. Inserting dead code
changes the appearance of a program. Do-nothing instructions such as “move eax, eax”,
“shl eax, 0”, “add ax, 0”, and “inc eax” followed by “dec eax” make program look
different. Adding new block of dead code on each generation creates different looking
programs with the same functionality. The Evol virus had implemented dead code
insertion by adding a block of dead code between core instructions as shown in figure 6.
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Figure 6: Dead code insertion in Evol virus [8]
These two blocks of instructions look different but have the same functionality. The
instructions commented garbage does not have any impact on the functionality of the
code.
5.3

Subroutine Permutation

This is a simple obfuscation technique in which the subroutines of a program are
reordered. A program with n different subroutines can generate (n-1)! different
subroutine permutations. Subroutine permutation does not affect the functionality of a
program as the order of subroutine is not important for its execution. Figure 3 shows an
example of subroutine permutation from [4].

Figure 7: Subroutine permutation [4]
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5.4

Equivalent Code Substitution

Equivalent code substitution is the replacement of an instruction with an equivalent
instruction or an equivalent block of instructions. In assembly language, generally a task
can be achieved in different ways. e.g. “inc eax” is equivalent to “add eax, 1”, “move eax,
edx” is equivalent to “push edx” followed by “pop eax” and so on. This property of
assembly language where a single task can be implemented in multiple ways is used in
equivalent code substitution.
Table 2: Examples of instruction substitution used by W32/MetaPhor virus [19]

Table 2 shows some examples of equivalent code substitution used by Win32/MetaPhor.
“Xor Reg, Reg” is equivalent to moving 0 into the Reg because xor of a value with itself
is 0. An equivalent instruction block for “OP Reg, Reg2” uses the ability of a processor to
perform the same operation with memory.
5.5

Transposition

Transposition or instruction permutation modifies the instruction execution order in a
program. This can be done only if no dependency exists among instructions. Consider
two instructions Instruction-1 (op1 R1, R2) and Instruction-2 (op2 R3, R4). These two
instructions can be swapped if following conditions are satisfied.
1. R1 is not equal to R3
2. R1 is not equal to R4
3. R2 is not equal to R3
For example, instructions “mov eax, edx” and “add ecx, 5” can be swapped as they
satisfy the transpose criteria.
…
mov
add
…

eax, edx
ecx, 5

…
add
mov
…
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ecx, 5
eax, edx

5.6

Changing the Control Flow (Code Reordering through jumps)

Code reordering inserts conditional or unconditional branching instruction after every
instruction or a block of instructions. These blocks defined by the branching instructions
are permuted to change the control flow. The modified code is called Spaghetti Code.
The conditional branching instruction is always preceded by a test instruction which
always forces the execution of the branching instruction.

Figure 8: Example of control flow modification [19]
Figure 8 shows an example of spaghetti code. Here, consecutive instructions are
permutated and linked together by unconditional jumps. The reordering of instructions
does not modify the order in which they are executed.
5.7

Subroutine Inlining and Subroutine Outlining

Subroutine inlining is a technique in which a subroutine call is replaced with its code
[CVM]. Subroutine inlining is a code obfuscation technique similar to dead code
insertion, the only difference is former inserts subroutine code whereas later inserts
arbitrary dead code in a program.
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…
Call S1
Call S2
…
S1:

move eax, ebx
add eax, 12h
push eax
ret

S2:

mul ecx
mov edx, eax
ret

…
move eax, ebx
add eax, 12h
push eax
mul ecx
mov edx, eax
…

Figure 9: Subroutine Inlining
Figure 9 shows an example of subroutine inlining where call to subroutines S1 and S2 is
replaced with its code.
Code outlining is reverse of code inlining. Code outlining converts a block of code into a
subroutine and replaces the block with a call to the subroutine. This technique essentially
does not preserve any logical code grouping [12].
…
move eax, ebx
call S12
mov edx, eax
…

…
move eax, ebx
add eax, 12h
push eax
mul ecx
mov edx, eax
…

S12:

push eax
add eax, 12h
mul ecx
ret

Figure 10: Subroutine Outlining
Figure 10 shows an example of subroutine outlining where subroutine S12 is created with
randomly selected block of code.
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6. Similarity Test
Metamorphic engine produces morphed copies of a single input program. Effective
metamorphic engine will generate highly dissimilar copies. Similarity test is used to
determine the diversity of the code generated by our metamorphic engine. We conducted
repetitive similarity test to improve metamorphism of our engine. The similarity test
compares two assembly programs and calculates the percentage of similarity between
them. To compute the similarity between two files, we followed the following steps [11].
1. Given two assembly files a.asm and b.asm, extract opcode sequences from each
file excluding comments, blank lines, labels, and other directives. Let’s call these
opcode sequences A and B for the files a.asm and b.asm respectively.
2. Consider m and n are the number of opcodes in A and B respectively.
3. Each opcode in A and B is assigned a number in ascending order i.e. first opcode
is assigned 0, second opcode is assigned 1, third opcode is assigned 2, and so on.
4. Opcode sequences of A and B are divided into subsequences of length 3.
5. Every subsequence in A is compared with all subsequences in B. It is considered
a match if the opcodes of any subsequence in A is same as the opcodes of any
subsequence in B. These opcodes can be in any order. For example A is
(mov,call,sub,add,test) and B is (mov,test,add,call,sub). The sequence
(call,sub,add) in A matches with (add,call,sub) of B.
6. All such matches of A are computed and added together to find total number of
match. This total number of matches is divided by m to get the similarity
percentage of A (X).
7. Similarly the similarity percentage of B (Y) is computed.
8. The average of X and Y will give the actual similarity percentage between files
a.asm and b.asm.
A graph is generated to visualize the similarity of the assembly files. Let’s look at how a
graph is generated:
1. Comparing two opcode sequences A and B, x axis represents opcode sequence A
and y axis represents opcode sequence B.
2. A co-ordinate (12, 25) is marked if the subsequence (12, 13, 14) of A matches
with the subsequence (25, 26, 27) of B.
3. A graph is generated by plotting all the matches for A and B (see figure 11-a).
4. But the graph in figure 11 is very populated. It is difficult to understand the
similarity.
5. To generate a clean graph, all the matches less than some threshold are dropped.
We assumed the threshold to be 5 and the graph in figure (11-a) is cleared in
figure (11-b).
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(a) All matches

(b) With threshold

Figure 11: Similarity Graph

7. Hidden Markov Model
Hidden Markov Model also known as HMM is a statistical pattern analysis tool. HMM
creates a model representing the input data. This input data is called training data. The
training data consists of a list of unique symbols and their positional information in input
sequence. HMM uses this model to determine if a given input sequence follows similar
pattern as the model.
HMM is widely used for speech recognition and protein modeling. Recently HM M has
been successfully used to detect metamorphic viruses [2, 9]. Metamorphic viruses are a
family of viruses that changes in appearance while preserving the same functionality.
Generally a family of viruses have similar pattern. Given a family of viruses HMM can
come up with the statistical model representing the family. Now any virus can be tested
against several such models to determine which family it belongs to.
Let’s look at a simple example to understand inner working of HMM [14]. Suppose we
want to determine annual temperatures of some distant location. The annual temperature
can be either hot (H) or cold (C). We know the probability of a hot year followed by
another hot year is 0.7 and a cold year followed by another cold year is 0.6. These
probabilities are represented in matrix below,

Figure 12: Temperature transition probability
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We also know the correlation between tree sizes and temperature. Tree sizes are of three
types small (S), medium (M), and large (L). The probability of tree being small in hot
year is 0.1, medium is 0.4, and large is 0.5. Similarly the probability of tree being small
in cold year is 0.7, medium is 0.2, and large is 0.1. The probabilistic relation between tree
sizes and annual temperature is given by the matrix below,

Figure 13: Tree size probability
In this example, the annual temperatures are the states and the tree sizes are the
observable symbols. The probability of different tree sizes at each temperature represents
the probability of the observation symbols in each state. The states (H and C) are hidden
since we can not see the temperature of distant location. We can only see the observation
symbols (S, M, and L) which are statistically related to the states.
Suppose we have a sequence of observation symbols (S, M, S, L) of four consecutive
years. We want to find out the sequence of states i.e. the annual temperature from the
sequence of tree sizes.
The notations used in HMM:
T = Length of the observed sequence
N = Number of states in the model
M = number of distinct observation symbols
O = Observation sequence {O0, O1, …, OT-1}
A = State transition probability matrix
B = Observation probability distribution matrix
π = Initial state distribution matrix
In this example, state transition probability matrix A, is the matrix with temperature
transition probability (figure 12) with N = 2. The observation probability distribution
matrix B, is the matrix of tree size probability (figure 13) with M = 3. Thus we get A and
B as shown below,
and
The initial state distribution matrix, π represents the probability of being in a state
initially. Consider the initial state distribution matrix for this example is
The matrices A, B, and π forms the parameters of HMM model. Note that, the parameters
A, B, and π are row stochastic, i.e. the summation of each row should be 1.
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Figure 14: HMM Model
So far we have HMM model representing tree sizes and temperatures. Consider an
observation sequence (S, M, S, L) of length T = 4. To determine the state transition for
this sequence, HMM follows these steps:
1. Determine all possible state transitions = NT.
2. Calculate the probability of given observation sequence for each state transition of
step 1. The formula used to calculate this probability is:
P(HHCC) = πH * bH(S) * aH,H * bH(M) * aH,C * bC(S) * aC,C * bC(L)
= (0.6) * (0.1) * (0.7) * (0.4) * (0.3) * (0.7) * (0.6) * (0.1)
= 0.000212
Table 3 shows list probabilities of observing (S, M, S, L) for all possible state
sequences.
3. The state sequence with highest probability is selected. The state sequence
“CCCH” has the highest probability in this example.
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Table 3: Probabilities of observing (S, M, S, L) for all possible state sequences

Therefore the most probable state sequence for given observation sequence is CCCH.
7.1

HMM as Virus Detection Tool

HMM as virus detection tool requires training data to produce a model. The training data
consists of observation sequence and unique symbols. The observation sequence and
unique symbols are derived from several viruses of a family. These viruses are programs
written in assembly language. The observation symbols are unique assembly opcodes
among all viruses. The opcodes of all viruses are concatenated to produce one long
observation sequence. HMM is trained on this observation sequence to produce the
model. An example of such observation sequence is shown in figure 15. The model is
shown in figure 16.
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(a) Unique Symbols
(b) Observation sequence
Figure 15: Training Data

Figure 16: HMM model
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Given a virus to test against HMM model, HMM produces following result file:

Figure 17: The Result File
In the result file, IDAN0 to IDAN4 are the viruses from the same family. The score for
these viruses is greater than -4.38 which are defined as a threshold. A file with a score
less than the threshold is not considered as part of this family. The files IDAR0 to IDAR4
have scores less than the threshold and therefore not in the family.

8. Implementation
8.1

Introduction

In general metamorphic engine has to implement some or all code obfuscation
techniques. In addition to using these techniques, each implementation will have its own
heuristics. These heuristics may include processes that decide type of obfuscation
techniques to use, when to apply them, and how to apply them.
We started our implementation by following some of the existing metamorphic engines
like Evol. Evol is a metamorphic virus that used code obfuscation techniques such as
dead code insertion, register / operands usage exchange, and equivalent instruction
substitution. In addition to the techniques used by Evol, we added few more variations of
these techniques. This section gives detailed explanation of the code obfuscation
techniques we used.
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8.2

Goals

Our implementation was geared toward achieving following goals:
• Generate morphed copies of a single input virus. These morphed copies
should have minimum similarity with the base virus and among themselves.
• The morphed copies should have same functionality as the base virus.
• Morphed copy should be close to normal program. Assumption here is the
normal programs are the cygwin utility files of the same size as the base virus.
The reason behind using cygwin utility files is they probably are doing same
low level operations as a virus.
• The metamorphic engine should work on any assembly program.
8.3 Code Obfuscation Techniques Used
8.3.1 Dead Code Insertion
Dead code insertion is adding NOP or do-noting instructions. We used dead code
insertion to introduce opcodes that are alien to the base virus. The alien opcodes were
determined by analyzing the base virus and normal programs.
We first generated statistics of the base virus to find out all the opcodes used. The graph
in figure 18 below lists the opcodes used in the base virus with their frequency.

Figure 18: Base virus opcodes and their frequency
Our base virus has 27 unique opcodes and six of them appear more than 10 times.
Opcodes mov, push, add, call, cmp, and jz are the most frequent appearing opcodes. We
designed our dead opcode set to include more of the infrequent used opcodes.
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We then analyzed the normal program for its opcode frequency. The graph in figure 19
shows the statistics of a normal file.

Figure 19: Opcodes of normal file and their frequency
When the statistics of a normal file is compared with the base virus, we get the list of
opcodes that are unique to a normal file. The unique opcodes are AND, INT, FNSTCW,
OR, FLDCW, LEAVE, JNS, SETNZ, SETZ, JB, CLD, JNB, SHL, INC, FLD, FSTP, and
REPE.
This comparison shows that the above unique opcodes should be included in morphed
copies to make them look more like a normal file. Based on this conclusion the dead code
instructions are modeled to include most of the above unique opcodes. The table 4 shows
some examples of dead code instructions used. Refer to Appendix A for complete list of
dead code instruction.
Table 4: Arithmetic Dead Code Instructions
1. add R, 0
2. sub R, 0
3. adc bx, 0
4. sbb bx, 0
5. inc R followed by dec R
These dead code instructions are injected at randomly selected locations in the base virus.
For every selected location, we insert a single dead code instruction. The dead code
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instruction to be inserted is randomly selected. These are categorized as simple single
NOP instruction substitution.
As the variation to simple single NOP instruction substitution, we introduced
unconditional jump NOP instruction substitution. The jump NOP works by introducing
unconditional jump to next immediate instruction. An example of this variation is shown
below.
mov edx, [esi+entryPoint]
pl010235:

jmp pl010235
mov edx, [esi+entryPoint]

8.3.1.1 NOP sequence insertion
Dead code insertion was used to insert a single NOP Instruction. In NOP sequence
insertion, a random sequence of NOP instructions are inserted at randomly selected
locations. The locations to insert NOP sequence were categorized in two viz. beginning
of the code section and rest of the code section. To insert or not to insert a NOP sequence
in the beginning of the code section is decided randomly. While for the rest of the code
section, the insertion location and a NOP sequence is selected randomly.
1.
2.
3.
4.

Determine entry point of a virus.
Generate random number between 0 to 3
If the random number is 0 then insert NOP sequence
To inset NOP sequence:
a. Randomly select length of a NOP sequence from 3, 5, and
7.
b. Generate random permutation of the above selected
length. For example if the length selected is 3 then 2^3
permutations are possible, randomly select any sequence
out of 8 permutations.
c. Insert this sequence into a virus.
Figure 20: Algorithm to insert NOP sequence on entry point

1. Generate random number between 0 to 50
2. Add a constant
to get
Figure:number
Algorithm
to value
insertXNOP sequence
3. For every X instruction in the base virus insert randomly selected
NOP sequence.
Figure 21: Algorithm to insert random NOP sequence
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8.3.1.2 Transformations of Evol
Along with a single dead code insertion and a NOP sequence insertion, we introduced
some new dead code insertions. These insertions are inspired from Evol virus [6]. Evol
virus substitutes a single instruction by surrounding it with dead code. The Evol
transformations used here are listed in table 5.
Table 5: Evol transformations [6]

One disadvantage with these transformations is an instruction is substituted with a block
of instructions beginning with push followed by some instructions and ending with pop.
Therefore these transformations increase the number of push and pop opcodes. This also
creates a pattern of starting with push and ending in pop [20].
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8.3.2 Equivalent instruction substitution
Some opcodes appear frequently in the base virus like mov, push, add, call, cmp, and jz.
To minimize the number of these opcodes, we used equivalent instruction substitution. In
an equivalent instruction substitution, an instruction is replaced with another instruction
or a block of instructions with the same functionality. For example substitutions for add
are listed in table 6.
Table 6: Substitutions for add
add R, imm
add R, 1

1. sub R, new_imm where new_imm = imm x (- 1)
2. lea R, [R + imm]
1. not R
neg R

Here, opcode add is replaced with opcodes like “sub”, “lea”, and “not” followed by
“neg”. Similarly opcodes like mov, cmp, test etc are replaced with equivalent
instructions. The complete list can be found in appendix B.
The substitution for each instruction is decided based on the type of operands like
REG (8), REG (8)
REG (16), REG (16)
REG (32), REG (32)
REG (8), MEM
REG (16), MEM
REG (32), MEM
REG (8), IMM
REG (16), IMM
REG (32), IMM
MEM, REG (8)
MEM, REG (16)
MEM, REG (32)
MEM, IMM
8.3.3 Transpose
After a morph copy is generated using dead code insertion and equivalent substitution,
we apply transpose to generate final output.
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1.
2.
3.
4.

Read two instructions with 2 operands.
Generate a random number between 0 and 3.
If the random number is 0 then perform transpose.
To perform transpose:
a. Read third instruction.
b. If the third instruction is not any conditional jump
instruction then
i. If to-operands of both instructions are not equal
and
to-operand of first instruction is not equal to fromoperand of second instruction
and
from-operand of first instruction is not equal to tooperand of second instruction
1. Swap two instructions.
Figure 22: Algorithm for transpose

The basic transpose algorithm applies only to instructions with register operands. We
extended this algorithm to include instructions with memory operands. To achieve this
extension, we added a new condition check. While comparing the operands in both the
instructions, we had to make sure that none of the registers are used as memory pointers.
For example following two instructions can be swapped.
mov ax, cx
add
[dx + 2], 5
The following two instructions can not be swapped.
mov ax, cx
add
[ax + 2], 5
The high level algorithm of our metamorphic engine is shown in figure 23.
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1. Determine the start of code section.
2. RAND_NUM = random number between 0 and 3.
3. If RAND_NUM = 0 then perform NOP sequence insertion at entry
point.
4. RAND_NUM = random number between 50 and 100
5. For every RADN_NUM instruction, perform random NOP sequence
insertion.
6. RAND_NUM_SUB = random number between 0 and 3
7. If RAND_NUM_SUB = 0 then select the instruction for Substitution //
substitution is done for about 1 in 4 instructions.
8. Substitution:
a. RAND_DEAD_EQUI = random number between 0 and 3.
b. If (RAND_DEAD_EQUI < 2)
//equivalent code substitution is done 66%
i. Perform equivalent code substitution
c. Else
i. Perform dead code insertion
//randomly select among Single NOP instruction insertion, //
jump NOP, and Evol transformations.
9. Repeat steps 5 to 8 till end of the file.
10. Perform transpose on the generated morphed code.
Figure 23: High level algorithm of Metamorphic Engine

9. Experiments
We generated a large of number of metamorphic virus variants of the base virus with our
metamorphic engine. The metamorphic virus variants were generated by applying the
metamorphic engine iteratively over a single base virus. Applying metamorphic engine
once on an input is 1st generation metamorphism. Applying the metamorphic engine
twice on an input is 2nd generation metamorphism and so on.
The metamorphic engine can take any assembly program as input. The output is a
morphed copy of the input. These assembly sources are then complied into executables
using FASM [21]. These executables are then disassembled using IDA Pro with default
settings (686 instruction set) [22]. These assembly programs were used to perform all
tests. To keep the tests more realistic IDA-pro generated assembly files were used rather
than the original assembly source from the engine.
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Any assembly program

Apply Metamorphic
Engine on input program

Metamorphic engine
generates Morphed
copies
Assemble output
programs using
assembler

Disassemble executables
using IDA-Pro

Model HMM on assembly programs and
conduct Similarity Test on morphed
assemblies

Figure 24: Over all Process
All our tests were performed using two different tools. These include Commercial virus
scanner, Similarity Test, and statistical pattern analysis tool such as Hidden Markov
Model.
9.1

Commercial virus scanner

In our testing, the base virus was successfully detected and quarantined by the
commercial virus scanner installed on our machine. But the same virus scanner failed to
detect morphed copies of the base virus.
9.2

Similarity Test

Similarity test compares and reports the percentage of similarity of two assembly
programs. The purpose of the similarity test is to measure the code diversity of the
morphed copies.
We compared the base virus with 1st to 9th generations of metamorphic copies. These
comparisons were performed using the default settings of similarity test i.e. 10 opcodes in
a sequence is considered a match. The result of this test is shown below in figure 25. The
similarity between the base virus and 1st generation virus is about 70%. The similarity
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decreases with higher generations. 9th generation virus is about 10% similar to the base
virus.

Figure 25: Similarity results of the base virus v/s 9 different generations
After applying the metamorphic engine to the base virus, the number of opcodes in
morphed copies increases. The dissimilar length of the compared files may affect
similarity test. So we compared a pair of viruses from the same generation. The viruses
from the same generation are of similar length. 1st generation viruses are about 50%
similar whereas 9th generation viruses are about 2.5% similar as shown in figure 26. Note
that, the viruses generated by Next Generation Virus Creation Kit (NGVCK) were found
to be about 10% similar with default settings [2]. Based on these similarity tests, we
decided to model HMM on highly dissimilar generation which is 9th generation.
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Figure 26: Graph of Similarity of two N generations

9.3

HMM

Similarity test shows that 9th generation viruses are highly metamorphic. To further test
morphed copies, the statistical pattern analysis tool such as HMM was used. This test
consists of four test cases:
1. N generation viruses against the base virus model
2. The base virus against the morphed virus model
3. Normal files against 9th generation virus model
4. Morphed viruses against normal file model
The idea of this test is to compare statistics of morphed copies with the base virus and
normal files.
9.3.1 N generation viruses against the base virus model
We trained HMM on 60 copies of the base virus with N = 2 and compared 9 different
generations of viruses against this model. The base virus model is listed in appendix D.
The 1st generation virus scored about -69 and next generations are showing low scores.
The statistical pattern of N different generations is different than the base virus.
Table 7: HMM of base virus tested with 9 generations
Virus
1 Generation
2nd Generation

Score
-68.722928938174
-131.862876167904

st
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3rd Generation
4th Generation
5th Generation
6th Generation
7th Generation
8th Generation
9th Generation

-198.857278862957
-234.377340367938
-261.32928056904
-297.823863014344
-319.359839713903
-338.517130927289
-343.070315142923

Figure 27: N (1-9) generation viruses tested against base virus model
9.3.2 The Base virus against the morphed virus model
We then modeled HMM for odd generations of viruses. The base virus was tested against
these modes and scores are listed in table 8. Results shows the statistical pattern of the
base virus can still be detected by different generation of viruses.
Table 8: The base virus tested against N Generation Model
Model
1 Generation Model
3rd Generation Model
5th Generation Model
7th Generation Model
9th Generation Model
st

Score
-2.26519095918038
-2.5616088296304
-2.7804691006756
-6.53547571903687
-9.36420192759975
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Figure 28: Base virus tested against N generation models
9.3.3 Normal files against 9th generation virus model
We collected 120 viruses from 9th generation and generated HMM model of that family.
We used 4 fold cross validation i.e. HMM was modeled on 90 viruses and 30 viruses
tested against this model. The model was generated with 2 states. The threshold for the
family is -4.2650. Any file scoring higher than the threshold is considered to be family
virus and a file having score less than threshold is considered a non-family file. Normal
files were tested against this model. Out of 30 normal files, the maximum score -11.7943
is less than the threshold. So all normal files are identified correctly and declared nonfamily files. This gives 0% false positives and 0% false negatives.
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Table 9: Results of 9th generation viruses tested against 9th generation model

G9_0
G9_1
G9_2
G9_3
G9_4
G9_5
G9_6
G9_7
G9_8
G9_9
G9_10
G9_11
G9_12
G9_13
G9_14

9th Generation Model with N =2
Family Viruses
Normal Files
-3.1677 G9_15
-4.2650 N0
-14.4239 N15 -356.9657
-3.1684 G9_16
-3.1277 N1
-42.9527 N16
-34.4798
-3.1269 G9_17
-3.1266 N2
-444.9695 N17
-11.7943
-3.1419 G9_18
-3.1248 N3
-532.4239 N18 -406.5270
-3.1596 G9_19
-3.1138 N4
-20.8160 N19 -406.5270
-3.1692 G9_20
-3.1250 N5
-18.7624 N20 -507.2849
-3.1419 G9_21
-3.1486 N6
-20.8160 N21
-15.2849
-3.1782 G9_22
-3.1517 N7
-17.2520 N22 -507.2849
-3.1115 G9_23
-3.1661 N8
-27.8287 N23 -473.7664
-3.1305 G9_24
-3.1420 N9
-19.0357 N24 -356.7943
-3.1404 G9_25
-3.1743 N10 -406.5270 N25
-36.2016
-3.1262 G9_26
-3.1522 N11
-37.8043 N26
-32.1237
-3.1299 G9_27
-3.1638 N12
-25.4653 N27 -507.2849
-3.1424 G9_28
-3.2038 N13
-23.9582 N28
-35.0315
-3.1300 G9_29
-3.1714 N14
-25.2204 N29 -356.9657
Min Score = -4.2650
Max Score = -11.7943

Figure 29: Family viruses and normal files tested against 9th generation model
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9.3.4 Morphed viruses against normal file model
We collected 40 cygwin files as a set of normal files. We generated HMM model on a set
of normal files. Then 9th generation viruses are tested against this model. The threshold
for normal files is -180.5254.All 9th generation viruses scored higher than the threshold.
The maximum score of 9th generation viruses is -37.2978. So the 9th generation viruses
are considered as normal files. This is 100% false positives.
Table 10: Results of 9th generation viruses tested against normal model
Normal model with N = 2
Normal Files
9th Generation Viruses
N0
-21.9658 G9_0
-173.3586
N1
-5.20571 G9_1
-160.9587
N2
-180.5254 G9_2
-154.1496
N3
-4.53708 G9_3
-159.1445
N4
-1.7961 G9_4
-168.9089
N5
-1.7246 G9_5
-169.4739
N6
-1.7961 G9_6
-164.7176
N7
-2.0771 G9_7
-37.2978
N8
-2.0542 G9_8
-169.2335
N9
-1.7599 G9_9
-158.5317
Min Score = -180.5254
Max Score = -37.2978

Figure 30: Family viruses and 9th generation viruses tested against normal model
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HMM model of normal files has very low threshold. The reason behind this low
threshold is less similarity within a set of normal files. With less similarity, generating
most probable model is difficult. And this is causing false positives.

10.Conclusion
We developed the metamorphic engine producing morphed copies of the base virus that
are highly dissimilar and includes some opcodes of the normal program. These were the
two main criteria described in [2] which are required in metamorphic virus to defeat
HMM. In our engine, we employed code obfuscation techniques such as equivalent
instruction substitution, dead code insertion, and transpose. We introduced floating point
opcodes in morphed copies which are commonly found in normal programs.
The similarity showed that the morphed copies are highly metamorphic with 2.5%
similarity index. Even with such a high metamorphism, HMM was able to classify the
morphed copies of the base virus as the family virus. The base virus was compared with
model of morphed copies, HMM was still able to classify the base virus as the same
family. This fact proves that even with high metamorphism, HMM is able to identify a
common statistical pattern across all morphed copies and the base virus. HMM has
proved very difficult to defeat.

11.Future Work
We implemented code obfuscation techniques such as equivalent instruction substitution,
dead code insertion, and transposition. The next step would be to include more code
obfuscation techniques into a metamorphic engine. Also, applying different subset of
code obfuscation techniques can generate more diverse morphed copies.
The size of the base virus is 1.5KB. Applying our metamorphic engine iteratively
changes the original file size. 1st generation morphed files are about 2 KB which 35 %
more than the original size. The graph in figure 31 reflects the increase in file size over
generations. A technique can be devised to implement a metamorphic engine such that
file sizes of the morphed copies do not change.
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Figure 31: Change in file sizes over 9 generations.
One of the techniques to make viruses look like normal programs is to compare the
HMM model parameters of a virus and normal files. The matrix B shows the probabilities
of observation symbols in all states. This matrix can be converted to a state transition
table. The state transition tables of virus and normal programs can be compared to change
the statistics of a virus. This may make virus look alike normal program.
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Appendix A: Dead code instructions
Transfer Dead Code
1. mov R, R
2. push R followed by pop R
Arithmetic Dead Code
1. add R, 0
2. sub R, 0
3. adc bx, 0
4. sbb bx, 0
5. inc R followed by dec R
Logical Dead Code
1. shl R, 0
2. shr R, 0
3. and R, 1
4. test R, 1
5. or R ,0
6. xor R, 0
Floating Point Dead Code
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

fadd st2, st0
fmul st2, st0
fld st2
fsub st2, st0
fdiv st2, st0
fst st3

Miscellaneous Dead Code
1. nop
2. neg R, not R, dec R
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Appendix B: Equivalent instruction substitution
Notations:
R – Register (eax, ax, ah, al)
RR – Random register
mem, [mem] – Memory address ([esi])
imm – Immediate value (12h)
op1 – To-operand with length more than 1 including R and mem
op2 – From-operand with length more than 1 including R, mem, and imm
loc – any location or label
add R, imm
add R, 1
mov R, imm

mov R1, R2
(no 8 bit R)
mov R, mem
(no 8 bit R)
mov R, imm
(no 8 bit R)
mov mem, R
(no 8 bit R)
mov mem, imm
cmp R, 0
cmp R1, R2
cmp R, mem
cmp R, imm
cmp mem, R
cmp mem, imm
and R1, R2

3. sub R, new_imm where new_imm = imm x (- 1)
4. lea R, [R + imm]
3. not R
neg R
1. mov R, random_imm
add R, new_imm where new_imm = imm – random_imm
2. mov R, random_imm
sub R, new_imm where new_imm = (random_imm - imm)
mov R, random_imm
xor R, new_imm
1. push R2
pop R1
1. push mem
pop R
1. push imm
pop R
2. lea R, [imm]
1. push R
pop mem
1. push imm
pop mem
1. or R, R
2. and R, R
3. test R, R
1. sub R1, R2
1. sub R, mem
1. sub R, imm
1. sub mem, R
1. sub mem, imm
1. push RR
mov R, R1
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2.

dec R

1.

dec mem

1.

inc R

1.
2.

inc mem

1.
2.

invoke op1, op2
jmp loc

1.
1.

jmp R

1.

lea R, [R1 + R2]

1.

lea R, [R + R1 + imm]

1.

lea R, [R1 + R2 + imm]

1.

lodsb

1.

lodsd

1.

movsb

1.

movsd

1.

or R, R2
xor R1, R2
xor R1, R
pop RR
not R1
not R2
or R1, R2
not R1
neg R
not R
neg mem
not mem
add R, 1
not R
neg R
add mem, 1
not mem
neg mem
stdcall [op1], op2
cmp RR, RR
jz loc
push R
ret
mov R, R1
add R, R2
add R, imm
add R, R1
lea R, [R1 + imm]
add R, R2
mov al, [esi]
add esi, 1
mov eax, [esi]
add esi, 4
push eax
mov al, [esi]
add esi, 1
mov [edi], al
add edi, 1
pop eax
push eax
mov [eax], esi
add esi, 4
mov [edi], eax
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neg R

1.

neg mem

1.

not R

1.
2.
3.

not mem

4.
1.
2.
3.

or R1, R2

1.

or R1, mem

1.

or R1, imm

1.

or mem, R

1.

add edi, 4
pop eax
not R
add R, 1
not mem
add mem, 1
neg R
sub R, 1
neg R
dec R
neg R
add R, -1
xor R, -1
neg mem
sub mem, 1
neg mem
dec mem
neg mem
add mem, -1
push RR
mov RR, R1
xor RR, R2
and R1, R2
xor R1, RR
pop RR
push RR
mov RR, R1
xor RR, mem
and R1, mem
xor R1, RR
pop RR
push RR
mov RR, R1
xor RR, imm
and R1, imm
xor R1, RR
pop RR
push RR
mov RR, mem
xor RR, R
and mem, R
xor mem, RR
pop RR
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or mem, imm

popad

stdcall op1, op2
stosb
stosd
sub R, imm
sub mem, imm
sub R, 1
sub mem, 1
test R1, R2
xchg R1, R2
xor R, R

1. push RR
mov RR, mem
xor RR, imm
and mem, imm
xor mem, RR
pop RR
1. pop edi
pop esi
pop ebp
add esp, 4
pop ebx
pop edx
pop ecx
pop eax
1. invoke [op1], op2
1. mov edi, [al]
add edi, 1
1. mov edi, [eax]
add edi, 4
1. add R, new_imm where new_imm = imm x (-1)
1. add mem, new_imm where new_imm = imm x (-1)
1. neg R
not R
1. neg mem
not mem
1. or R1, R2
1. xor R1, R2
xor R2, R1
xor R1, R2
1. sub R, R
2. mov R, 0
3. and R, 0
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Appendix C: Similarity Tests
Table C-1: Comparison results of the base virus with N generations

Base virus and 1st generation virus

Base virus and 2nd generation virus

Base virus and 3rd generation virus

Base virus and 4th generation virus
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Base virus and 5th generation virus

Base virus and 6th generation virus

Base virus and 7th generation virus

Base virus and 8th generation virus

Base virus and 9th generation virus
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Table C-2: Comparison of N generations

1st Generation

2nd Generation

3rd Generation

4th Generation

5th Generation

6th Generation
45

8th Generation

7th Generation

9th Generation
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Appendix D: Hidden Markov Model of the Base Virus
Table D-1: HMM parameters (A, B, π) of the base virus with N = 2
N = 2, M = 27, T = 13620
π:
0.00000000000000
A:
0.00000000000454
0.78098025609290
B:
start 0.00000000000000
call
0.16075993445552
pop
0.01818103103059
sub
0.03658902222441
xor
0.01367743341443
mov 0.22927558802501
lodsd 0.02009499180694
add
0.12595237659940
inc
0.00000000000000
cmp 0.00000000000000
jnz
0.08037996722776
dec
0.00000000000000
lea
0.03647826819294
push 0.09843010755634
stosd 0.00000000000000
lodsb 0.01004749590347
loop 0.00000000000000
test
0.00000000000000
jz
0.10047495903470
movzx 0.00000000000000
imul 0.01004749590347
pusha 0.00000000000000
popa 0.00000000000000
rep
0.00000000000000
retn 0.00937384910765
jmp 0.04018998361388
jle
0.01004749590347

1.00000000000000
0.99999999999544
0.21901974390710
0.01569168387372
0.00000000000000
0.04856961642305
0.01850358587934
0.00501131319206
0.22110228244243
0.00000000000000
0.18409720285682
0.03138336774743
0.10199594517915
0.00000000000000
0.02353752581057
0.01859007097306
0.22128034835740
0.00784584193686
0.00000000000000
0.00784584193686
0.03138336774743
0.00000000000000
0.02353752581057
0.00000000000000
0.00784584193686
0.00784584193686
0.01569168387371
0.00824111208583
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
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Table D-2: HMM parameters (A, B, π) of the base virus with N = 3
N = 3, M = 27, T = 13620
π:
1.00000000000000
A:
0.10040502462601
0.12520909122804
0.00000000000000
B:
start 0.00108025173100
call
0.00000000000000
pop
0.00000000000000
sub
0.00000000000000
xor
0.00000000000000
mov 0.00000000000000
lodsd 0.00000000000000
add
0.00000000000000
inc
0.00000000000000
cmp 0.49078744655348
jnz
0.00000000000000
dec
0.00000000000000
lea
0.31368699013508
push 0.00000000000000
stosd 0.00000000000000
lodsb 0.00000000000000
loop 0.00000000000000
test
0.00000000000000
jz
0.00000000000000
movzx 0.00000000000000
imul 0.00000000000000
pusha 0.06481510386015
popa 0.00000000000000
rep
0.12963020772030
retn 0.00000000000000
jmp 0.00000000000000
jle
0.00000000000000

0.00000000000000

0.00000000000000

0.08365175778876
0.87479090877196
0.12467619840110

0.81594321758522
0.00000000000000
0.87532380159890

0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.03556280523263
0.05419236906398
0.01806412302133
0.41203378876197
0.01806412302133
0.32515421438388
0.01806412302133
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.01047971535740
0.02709618453199
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.02709618453199
0.00903206151066
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000821
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.03612824604265
0.00903206151066

0.01966848475016
0.15867012907693
0.04028836621593
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.05336255596307
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.01983376613462
0.05382769681044
0.07933506453846
0.02975064920192
0.00000000000000
0.34709090735578
0.00991688306731
0.00991688306731
0.00991688306731
0.03966753226923
0.09916883067308
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.00991688305829
0.00000000000000
0.01966848475016
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
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Appendix E: Hidden Markov Models of Normal Files
Table E-1: HMM parameters (A, B, π) for Normal Files with N = 2
N = 2, M = 56, T = 7351
π:
1.00000000000000
A:
0.86450620287537
0.04500882863247
B:
start 0.02837277526002
push 0.23166166493378
mov 0.18848829422565
sub
0.00575803807657
and
0.01273100451890
test
0.00000000000000
jz
0.00000000000000
int
0.00000000000000
fnstcw 0.00000000000000
movzx 0.00047405096064
or
0.00000000000000
fldcw 0.00000000000000
call
0.00000000000000
leave 0.03382907819464
retn 0.12604059778972
cmp 0.00000000000000
jle
0.00000000000000
xor
0.01057672968058
lea
0.00000000000000
pop
0.15932404569090
jmp 0.12567211288436
add
0.00000000000000
jb
0.00572386768789
jnz
0.00000000000000
jnb
0.01225924226040
insw 0.01200386645616
insb 0.01200386645616
imul 0.01855142997771

0.00000000000000
0.13549379712462
0.95499117136753
0.00000000000000
0.00243304736880
0.55363549869642
0.05663085598714
0.01842715311818
0.02537492730648
0.03208115809462
0.00471248649977
0.00489373598054
0.01416123698577
0.01558745534541
0.00507498546130
0.10584969676417
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.03171865913310
0.00181249480761
0.02331150612693
0.02555617678724
0.00000000000000
0.01860985171079
0.02048119132594
0.00734234806584
0.00634373182662
0.00100266520921
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
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dec
arpl
cld
repe
movsx
jg
inc
setnz
popa
outsb
setz
jge
jbe
shl
shr
neg
sar
jl
jns
cdq
xchg
ror
js
ja
fstp
fld
fsub
fistp

0.00000000000000
0.00436504234770
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.00054563029346
0.00109126058692
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.00109126058692
0.00054563029346
0.00889051083744
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000

0.00090624740380
0.00000000000000
0.00181249480761
0.00253749273065
0.00054374844228
0.00090624740380
0.00471248649977
0.00036249896152
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.00090624740380
0.00181249480761
0.00144999584608
0.00072499792304
0.00036249896152
0.00018124948076
0.00036249896152
0.00163124532685
0.00072499792304
0.00018124948076
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.00121545541851
0.00163124532685
0.00090624740380
0.00072499792304
0.00018124948076
0.00018124948076

Table E-2: HMM parameters (A, B, π) for Normal Files with N = 3
N = 3, M = 56, T = 7351
π:
0.00000
0.0000
A:
0.11796
0.23553
1.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.10631
B:
start 0.00916
0.00000
push 0.00139
0.00000
mov 0.05227
0.00000
sub
0.00000
0.07713
and
0.02354
0.00000
test
0.00000
0.17199
jz
0.18844
0.00000
int
0.02820
0.00000
fnstcw 0.00000
0.03317
movzx 0.04580
0.03909
or
0.09083
0.00000
fldcw 0.00000
0.00000
call
0.00000
0.00000
leave 0.00000
0.07616
retn 0.25062
0.00000
cmp 0.00000
0.21499
jle
0.01084
0.00000
xor
0.00116
0.00000
lea
0.00000
0.00000
pop
0.07111
0.27820
jmp 0.00000
0.00000
add
0.00000
0.00000
jb
0.05533
0.00000
jnz
0.03045
0.00000
jnb
0.00556
0.02810
insw 0.02386
0.00000
insb 0.00000
0.02702
imul 0.02859
0.00856

1.00000
0.64649
0.00000
0.89368
0.00775
0.07778
0.59701
0.04634
0.01839
0.00000
0.00058
0.00000
0.00000
0.00088
0.00040
0.00498
0.10401
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.02616
0.02511
0.00000
0.05931
0.02012
0.00000
0.00123
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00011
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dec
arpl
cld
repe
movsx
jg
inc
setnz
popa
outsb
setz
jge
jbe
shl
shr
neg
sar
jl
jns
cdq
xchg
ror
fstp
fld
fsub
fistp
js
ja

0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00108
0.00426
0.00000
0.00216
0.00108
0.00000
0.00541
0.01084
0.00867
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00976
0.00254
0.00000
0.00000
0.00108
0.00108
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.02495
0.00976

0.00367
0.00982
0.00000
0.01719
0.00000
0.00000
0.00512
0.00000
0.00000
0.00245
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00249
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00203
0.00000
0.00149
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00122
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000

0.00035
0.00000
0.00178
0.00000
0.00035
0.00018
0.00388
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00035
0.00035
0.00017
0.00035
0.00000
0.00000
0.00017
0.00013
0.00000
0.00071
0.00071
0.00000
0.00017
0.00000
0.00000

Appendix F: Hidden Markov Model of 9th Generation Viruses
Table F-1: HMM parameters (A, B, π) for 9th Generation viruses with N= 2
N = 2, M = 47, T = 87227
π:
1.00000000000000
A:
0.83217007332176
0.08209140361062
B:
start 0.00224949833917
fmul 0.13115095949748
and
0.17276039691696
shl
0.13727941735826
sub
0.11372459106253
fdiv 0.13170570484462
test
0.02444614244857
shr
0.03304940152925
push 0.00713112355913
mov 0.03714484588762
pop
0.02277679405086
fadd 0.00633423017186
fsub 0.00735821962914
inc
0.01092985748609
dec
0.01260818677659
lea
0.00498067906121
neg
0.00000000000000
add
0.02522026658893
not
0.00000000000000
lodsd 0.00000000000000
or
0.02324562742933
fld
0.00751349266042
xor
0.02553306865696
cmp 0.00007327119005

0.00000000000000
0.16782992667822
0.91790859638939
0.00197266362902
0.01746554640060
0.01174130398615
0.02718683702829
0.03937598271045
0.01825268605848
0.01960868462539
0.00000000000000
0.14030039356432
0.10603456753864
0.09742469565353
0.02556683045773
0.02573173079309
0.01724059842838
0.01775123603675
0.01948515838277
0.01949739541988
0.07540022875981
0.02011202434730
0.00276583017340
0.02031550185330
0.02435821944460
0.02290130532883
0.01795912402610
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loop 0.00000000000000
jz
0.00052823655886
movzx 0.00094894665121
imul 0.00000000000000
pusha 0.00002523370760
rep
0.00000000000000
retn 0.00051071682025
jle
0.00000000000000
popa 0.00000000000000
cli
0.00000000000030
rcr
0.00000000000000
retf
0.00000000000000
rol
0.00002939919037
fild
0.00000000000000
jmp 0.02679258523014
fstp
0.00679951925229
adc
0.01029664573503
sbb
0.01075435812487
call
0.00000000000000
fst
0.00579144863872
jnz
0.00030713494533
stosd 0.00000000000000
lodsb 0.00000000000000

0.00153657231855
0.01510730365676
0.00414548110843
0.00153657231855
0.00152422769242
0.00307314463711
0.00284036899599
0.00153657231855
0.00017073025762
0.00013658420595
0.00001707302576
0.00010243815457
0.00003683664806
0.00003414605152
0.03806061083191
0.02609041870823
0.02427714520424
0.02238007040261
0.02555831956528
0.02817137008812
0.01214232452585
0.00153657231855
0.00153657231855

Table F-2: HMM parameters (A, B, π) for 9th Generation viruses with N= 3
N = 3, M = 47, T = 87227
π:
0.00000
0.00000
A:
0.90141
0.00000
0.37895
0.08330
0.00001
0.62948
B:
start 0.00257
0.00000
fmul 0.02255
0.06837
and
0.01882
0.08862
shl
0.03193
0.10137
sub
0.04047
0.10276
fdiv 0.02233
0.20430
test
0.02157
0.01948
shr
0.00000
0.01738
push 0.15554
0.01043
mov 0.11757
0.03208
pop
0.10929
0.00000
fadd 0.02761
0.00463
fsub 0.02737
0.01762
inc
0.00000
0.00000
dec
0.00000
0.10118
lea
0.02084
0.00000
jmp 0.04327
0.01806
fstp
0.02793
0.00427
adc
0.02622
0.01564
sbb
0.02370
0.01739
call
0.02813
0.00000
fst
0.02974
0.01103
neg
0.00000
0.00646
add
0.06624
0.01300

1.00000
0.09858
0.53774
0.37051
0.00212
0.13061
0.16907
0.12015
0.09859
0.04094
0.02138
0.03502
0.00000
0.02844
0.02691
0.00720
0.00085
0.06561
0.00000
0.00865
0.02202
0.00879
0.00520
0.00579
0.00000
0.00397
0.05219
0.07111
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rcr
0.00001
retf
0.00011
rol
0.00005
fild
0.00003
not
0.00000
lodsd 0.00263
or
0.02292
fld
0.02541
xor
0.02201
cmp 0.01941
jnz
0.01219
stosd 0.00000
lodsb 0.00000
loop 0.00169
jz
0.01268
movzx 0.00484
imul 0.00167
pusha 0.00168
rep
0.00338
retn 0.00340
jle
0.00169
popa 0.00018
cli
0.00015

0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.06270
0.00158
0.01813
0.01759
0.03781
0.00150
0.00000
0.00000
0.00649
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000

0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.01536
0.00000
0.01908
0.00228
0.01874
0.00000
0.00353
0.00446
0.00000
0.00000
0.01115
0.00060
0.00004
0.00002
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000

